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A Friendship of Words: Philology and
Prophesy in Hölderlin’s “Rousseau”
Anthony Curtis Adler Yonsei University
Taking its departure from Norbert von Hellingrath’s interpretation of the signiﬁcance
of Rousseau for Friedrich Hölderlin, the following paper argues, through a close read-
ing of the poem “Rousseau,” that Hölderlin, contra Hellingrath, conceives of his rela-
tion to Rousseau in philological rather than prophetic terms. Looking closely at the
complexities of Hölderlin’s manuscript while contrasting the philological approaches
of Freidrich Beißner’s Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe and D. E. Sattler’s Frankfurter Aus-
gabe, I demonstrate that an explicitly philological moment is inscribed into the text of
the poem itself, and that it addresses its reader as a speciﬁcally philological reader,
while at the same time seeking to establish a “friendship of words” with Rousseau’s
prophetic utterance.
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In his 1970 students’ edition of Hölderlin’s collected poetry, Detlev Lüders,
commenting on the ode “Rousseau,” cites the following passage from Norbert
von Hellingrath’s historical-critical edition without further comment, as if its
truth stood beyond question. “Rousseau ist für Hölderlin,” Hellingrath writes,
“der Genius, besonders der einsame Seher kat exochen [. . .], und damit Träger
seiner eigenen Empﬁndungen, beinahe nur ein anderer Name für Hölderlin”
(Hölderlin/Lüders 189). Hellingrath was certainly prescient in recognizing the
need for greater research into Hölderlin’s relation to Rousseau; he indeed consid-
ered it crucial for reconstructing a pan-European concept of Romanticism (Höl-
derlin/Hellingrath 4: 327; Cf. de Man 19). Yet if one pays more than passing
attention to this passage, its strangeness soon becomes evident: Hölderlin’s
poetry, it is claimed, is not mere poetry, serving certain social or aesthetic or
even intellectual ends, nor even just a work of genius in the more ordinary sense,
but a manner of prophetic speech, issuing from the solitude of the one who does
not belong to his or her own time; the seer who can see past his own time and
into another age. Yet the very role of the prophet – of a certain radical originality
and untimeliness – has itself been borrowed from Rousseau, whose own pro-
phetic solitude is imitated through an act of almost perfect identiﬁcation.
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Hellingrath’s remark might appear as nothing more than a typical manifesta-
tion of the enthusiasms that continue, till this day – and on both sides of the ideo-
logical spectrum – to play a role in Hölderlin’s reception. Yet it also brings into
focus a constellation of motifs that have exerted considerable inﬂuence on the
interpretation of Hölderlin and that are instructive precisely because they touch
at, even if catastrophically misrecognizing, a moment very crucial to his work.
This moment is the philological. Hellingrath himself is, of course, justly famed
as the ﬁrst great Hölderlin-philologist; the critical edition that he initiated, and
that his untimely death kept him from ﬁnishing, laid the foundation for the
extraordinary scholarship of the following decades, preparing the way for Frie-
drich Beißner’s Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe and D. E. Sattler’s Frankfurter Aus-
gabe. Yet for all the philological rigor with which Hellingrath approaches
Hölderlin’s texts, he understands philology for the most part merely as the
means for recovering the “pure word” of the text. He does not yet regard philol-
ogy as that which, being inscribed into the text in its composition rather than
arising from the vicissitudes of its transmission and reception, is itself integral to
the text, and indeed has an intimate and complex relation to its untimeliness and
prophetic potential.
The following paper aims to explore precisely this connection between phi-
lology and prophetic untimeliness that exists in the work of Friedrich Hölderlin,
focusing on the unﬁnished poem “Rousseau.” This poem, which will be ap-
proached with a view to the philological challenges that it presents, is not Höl-
derlin’s most difﬁcult or enigmatic. Composed around 1800, it stands at the
threshold of the period in which Hölderlin’s greatest poems would be written.
But it nevertheless puts in sharp relief the complex interaction between the pro-
phetic register and a philological mode of reading, indeed a provocation of the
reader toward philology, that is inscribed into the text.
Before turning to “Rousseau,” it will be useful to say a few words about the
concept of philology and clarify my own use of the term. The philological
moment in Hölderlin does indeed have much to do with the traditional practices
of textual curatorship that Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht defends in The Powers of
Philology – practices that were crucial to Hölderlin’s revival and canonization in
the twentieth century. Yet philology will also be taken at once more broadly and
more literally: not only as the tenacious, meticulous care and study of the written
word, nor as another name for literary scholarship and criticism as such, but
indeed as a love and friendship for the word and for language that rivals philoso-
phy as that other “intellectual” love, the love of wisdom. While this last sense of
philology is perhaps never completely out of play in its long and complex history,
it is above all within the last two and a half centuries that language, conceived in
the singularity of its historical and textual manifestations and in its structural irre-
ducibility to pure a priori rationality, has offered itself as the site where a new
kind of knowledge and experience, deeper and more radical than the reason of the
philosophers and yet rigorous in its own way, would be possible. Sometimes this
turn to language has taken place as a transformation of philosophy itself, or has at
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least been appropriated without too much difﬁculty to its disciplinary practices.
Yet in other instances – and most notably in Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich
Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Walter Benjamin, Paul de Man, Peter Szondi, Wer-
ner Hamacher, and Giorgio Agamben – it has attached itself, if sometimes only in
passing, not only to the name of philology but also to its practices.
Philology is, however, not only a rival of philosophy but also of philosophy’s
own more familiar rival: prophetic revelation. So long as revelation assumes the
form of scripture, philology becomes necessary as a means for accessing religious
truth. Yet left to its own devices, philology has tended to unsettle the claims of
revelation. At the same time, once it begins to present itself explicitly as a rival to
philosophy, philology enters into a fraught, complex, and perilous alliance with
prophetic registers: seeking to ﬁnd a truth in the text that cannot be reduced to the
pure reason of the philosophers, it tends to treat secular texts as if sacred, turning
them into a counterfeit prophesy. This tendency, as already witnessed in Helling-
rath and Lüders, is seldom so evident than in the reception of Hölderlin’s poetry.
Because Hölderlin at once invokes prophetic registers – indeed operates at a
plane that has little to do with the aesthetic and didactic values by which poetry
has traditionally been understood – and at the same time poses tremendous chal-
lenges for scholarship at every level, the philological labors invested in his work
tend to add to its “sacred” aura, transforming it into a kind of scripture. The dan-
ger of Hellingrath’s Hölderlin-philology, and indeed of any reading that neglects
the ways in which the philological complicates the prophetic, is that, for all its
philological labors, it will end up dissolving the philological into the prophetic,
and treating the former as a means and conduit to the latter. Poetic, “secularized”
prophesy, in this way, simply takes the place of philosophy as the source of foun-
dational truths. For just this reason it is so important not only to read Hölderlin
philologically but also to attend to the philological moment that is in Hölderlin,
indeed inscribed into the poetic text. This moment not only challenges the claims
of philosophy but at the same time also complicates the prophetic register that
emerges, above all in poetry, as soon as philosophy has itself been neutralized.
Projected into the future as a summons to the philologist-reader, and indeed as
the summons to a kind of friendship of words, the philological moment in Hölder-
lin resists every prophetic interpretation that would come too soon, seeking to
cash out the value of prophesy in a present moment that must still be foreseeable
from the vantage point of the past and, hence, continuous with the past. It is, in
other words, that which rends the fabric of eschatological time, rendering it dis-
continuous, by folding it back upon the fabric of the text.
Because the philological moment in Hölderlin is inscribed into his poetry,
we must approach it by way of the conﬂict between different philological ap-
proaches to which his manuscripts have given rise. Rather than privileging one
single approach, I will make use of both of the two principal modern critical edi-
tions of Hölderlin’s writings: the Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe, which was begun
by Friedrich Beißner in 1943, and the Frankfurter Ausgabe, which was initiated
by D. E. Sattler in 1972. These two editions, which will be identiﬁed with the
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respective abbreviations GSA and FA, follow strikingly different editorial proce-
dures: whereas Beißner presents a single constituted text, relegating alternate
readings to a companion volume, Sattler seeks, through an innovative and
remarkable editorial apparatus together with the inclusion of facsimiles of the
manuscript pages, to foreground both unresolvable ambiguities and the process
of composition itself.
The constituted text of the second version (constituted text II in the Frank-
furter Ausgabe) of “Rousseau” may be divided into three sections. The ﬁrst
(stanzas 1–4) evokes in very general and suggestive terms the “tragic” dimension
of Rousseau’s fate; the second (stanzas 5–6) uses the image of the tree to urge
Rousseau to contentment; and the third (stanzas 7–10) offers a new, afﬁrmative,
interpretation of Rousseau’s life. The ﬁrst section reads:
Wohl eng begränzt ist unsere Tageszeit.
Du warst und sahst und stauntest, und Abend ists.
Nun schlafe wo unendlich ferne
Ziehen vorüber die Völkerjahre
Und mancher siehet über die eigne Zeit
Ihm zeigt ein Gott ins Freie, doch sehnend stehst
Am Ufer du, ein Aergerniß den
Deinen, ein Schatten, und liebst sie nimmer,
Und jene, die du nennst, die Verheißenen,
Wo sind die Neuen, daß du an Freundeshand
Erwarmst, wo nahn sie, daß du einmal
Einsame Rede, vernehmlich seiest?
Klanglos ists armer Mann, in der Halle dir,
Und gleich den Unbegrabenen, irrest du
Unstät und suchest Ruh und niemand
Weiß den beschiedenen Weg zu weisen. (FA 5: 787)
These lines would seem to present the kernel of a prophetic poetics that ap-
propriates the traditional Christian understanding of John the Baptist as the
prophet who, coming in advance of Christ, initiates the messianic event. Rous-
seau’s words, words that promise to ground a new world, cannot yet take root
because they lack the community capable of hearing and understanding them.
The prophetic word cannot but remain in a state of ongoing hesitant staunen at
the limit that separates the existing world from the future. According to Grimm’s
German dictionary, staunen corresponds to the Latin stupere, which can mean
“to be astonished or amazed at,” “to wonder at,” but also simply “to be struck
senseless” (Bartz et al.). The prophet has been left immobilized, and perhaps it is
not the prophet’s words but only his sacriﬁce that could make it possible to
move on and institute a new order of things.
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Yet we at the same time see that if, for Hellingrath, this prophetic interpreta-
tion of Hölderlin might justify the latter in his own identiﬁcation with Rousseau,
and hence also with John the Baptist as the prophet of the coming divinity, the
basis of interpreting Hölderlin’s poetry prophetically is perhaps nothing else
than another highly problematic, if seemingly natural and justiﬁable, substitu-
tion: Hölderlin is identiﬁed with, and takes the place of, Hölderlin’s Rousseau-
bild. This substitution and identiﬁcation, moreover, presupposes a certain
understanding of the nature of poetic address: namely that one poet only ad-
dresses the other in an act of identiﬁcation, as if true poets could only ever speak
of themselves and their experiences, or perhaps of poetry itself. Thus Rousseau’s
loneliness, and by extension also Hölderlin’s, becomes the effect of a method of
interpretation that reads its own premises into the work and rejoices in those
works that conﬁrm what it already knows.
The rest of the poem, however, suggests that Hölderlin names Rousseau pre-
cisely in order to correct this deeply rooted presupposition. Rather than repro-
ducing Rousseau’s loneliness, it corrects this loneliness by correcting the
understanding of language from which it issues. To make sense of this complex
strategy, we must ﬁrst observe that Rousseau’s lonely speech is anything but the
impressionistic and vague appropriation of the cult of Rousseau. It has a speciﬁc,
precise reference, invoking the ﬁrst lines of Rousseau’s “Les Rêveries du Prome-
neur Solitaire,” a text that is implicated throughout Hölderlin’s poem, and which
was among those of Rousseau’s that Hölderlin had most likely read (Link 25).
Indeed, as Paul de Man claims, it would later become “for Hölderlin Rousseau’s
most revealing text” (25). The ﬁrst “walk” begins:
Me voici donc seul sur la terre, n’ayant plus de frère, de prochain, d’ami, de so-
ciété que moi-même. Le plus sociable et le plus aimant des humains en a été
proscrit par un accord unanime. [So here I am, alone on the earth, no longer
having a brother, neighbor, friend, or society but myself. The most social and
loving of human beings has been proscribed from society by a unanimous
agreement.] (Rousseau 33; my translation)
Rousseau’s “lonely speech” is lonely in at least two ways: not only because it
has failed to ﬁnd the community of listeners that could belong to it but also
because it is a speech that declares loneliness, or indeed calls, in a rather intimate
way (“voici”), for the reader to bear witness to Rousseau’s being alone. If the
paradox here is all too obvious, it at once supports and gainsays the loneliness of
the speech: if the speech cannot be lonely, since it has the reader as its most inti-
mate companion, it still also must remain lonely, as this very contradiction with-
draws the conditions of its comprehension.
The loneliness of Rousseau’s speech, we might even say, is the loneliness of
speech and conversation itself: of the voice that, trying to become perfectly inti-
mate with itself so as to communicate its own most intimate self with the other,
discovers, through a dialectic familiar both to Hölderlin and the Early Romantics,
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an absolute distance from itself, since the very act of self-reﬂection, which would
guarantee perfect self-presence, makes the self all too painfully aware of the
absolute difference from itself. Yet Hölderlin’s “Rousseau” responds to this
loneliness – intervening in it, and even in a sense undoing it. Refusing to identify
with Rousseau’s loneliness and to mimic it by appropriating Rousseau’s prophetic
stance as its own, it instead challenges an understanding of friendship, sociality,
and language rooted in the solitude of subjectivity and the intimate self-presence
of the voice. Most telling, in this regard, is the imperative “now sleep.” This,
again, seems to invoke the Reveries: in the second paragraph of the ﬁrst walk,
Rousseau remarks that, even after ﬁfteen years, his condition still seems like a
dream (rêve), and that he still imagines himself to be dreaming a bad dream (un
mauvais sommeil ), from which he will wake up and ﬁnd himself with his friends.
If we suppose that the addressee of the poem is not so much Rousseau as
Rousseau’s words, and indeed the disquiet of words whose paradoxical publica-
tion of solitude remains a provocation long after Rousseau’s death, then the
nature of this imperative could only consist in somehow commanding, authoriz-
ing, and enabling sleep by performing the institution of a new relation to lan-
guage that would, as it were, undo the conditions of this unrest. Indeed, as a
word addressed to a word, the imperative “now sleep” already in a certain sense
performs the effect that it commands: Rousseau’s words can and must sleep for
the very reason that, at the moment of this address, they are relieved of their soli-
tude. Whereas Rousseau imagines himself to be sleeping and dreaming badly,
and still thinks that he might awaken and ﬁnd himself with his old friends, Höl-
derlin orders a different kind of sleep – a good sleep, as it were: a sleep that
would lead not away from but toward friends. But this would not be the case if
Hölderlin’s poem simply assumed the solitude of Rousseau’s words as its own.
Rather, what is crucial is that the speciﬁc nature of the command to sleep
involves an extreme of intimacy without identiﬁcation, since it is precisely the
one who will remain awake and vigilant, who has taken the vigil upon himself,
who could command the other to sleep. Thus, at the very moment when
Hölderlin addresses Rousseau and his words, and the identiﬁcation of Hölderlin
and Rousseau seems absolute, the identiﬁcation, or at least the identiﬁcation
with the Rousseau who has been named, breaks down. For Hölderlin’s word, in
the instance of this command, is no longer lonely, and neither is Rousseau’s: but
the one has addressed the other; a conversation has begun, even if only just
begun, and just at the point, on the verge of sleep, where the solitude of the soul
threatens to become absolute.
The words that follow this intimate command to sleep, moreover, continue
this transformation of sleep – of what would seem to be the most solitary thing –
into the space where a certain kind of society, and indeed a new friendship, is
possible. For in telling Rousseau, or rather Rousseau’s words, where to sleep, it
also creates this location – the space-time of the conversation that passes through
and even constitutes the “years of the peoples.” Thus Rousseau’s reveries, which
had insisted above all else on pure solitude as their condition of possibility, are,
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through the almost violent imposition of the friendly address of Hölderlin’s text,
transformed from a dream-time of pure subjectivity (in Kantian terms: the imagi-
native auto-production of time as the condition of possibility of experience) into
the dream-time of a mode of Being that is at once textual and historical.
A second, ﬁnal imperative, appearing in the beginning of the ﬁfth stanza,
complements this ﬁrst imperative to sleep. This second imperative is peculiar
both because it seems to contradict the ﬁrst and because the addressee is so un-
clear. Whereas the ﬁrst imperative forcefully disambiguates between Hölderlin
and Rousseau, this second, as will become clear, once again seems to suggest
the identity of the two. These ambiguities are further compounded by the
extraordinary textual problems that these lines involve. In contrast to the ﬁrst six-
teen lines of the poem, the remainder of the unﬁnished poem has not yet been
brought into a polished Alcaic metre. Yet it is in just this way – through a certain
strategy of textual overdetermination – that Hölderlin’s “Rousseau” conﬁrms the
sense of philology that the ﬁrst imperative initiates.
The Stuttgarter edition, following Hellingrath, reads:
Sei denn zufrieden! (GSA 2:12)
The constituted text (II D) of the Frankfurter Ausgabe reads:
So eile denn zufrieden! (FA 5: 787)
The Frankfurter Ausgabe, which provides a photographic reproduction of the
manuscript together with a typeface transcription on facing pages, casts light on
the mystery of these two very different readings. The ﬁrst imperative (“Sei denn
zufrieden!”) is never stricken out, and yet above it is written “Nein,!” and above
this “Nein,!”: “Eile.”
The whole appears as follows:
Eile
(Nein(,)!)[So] (FA 4:230)
The reading “So eile denn zufrieden!” seems in some ways rather violent, even
though it does manage to preserve the Alcaic metre. It is possible, indeed, that
there are even more ambiguities than the Frankfurter Ausgabe, despite its
extraordinary philological rigor, acknowledges. Ignoring the strict metrical re-
quirements, we could also read the line:
Nein! Eile zufrieden!
This does not completely do justice to the superscription of “Eile” and the under-
lining of “Nein,” but it is, at the very least, less awkward than “So eile denn
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zufrieden.” Indeed, we need only elide the “e” to recover the same metrical pat-
tern as “Sei denn zufrieden!”
Nein! Eil’ zufrieden!
Or, again omitting the “Nein!”:
Eile zufrieden!
The point is not that any of these readings is or could be correct. What is striking,
though, is that the “Nein!” that precipitates this multiplying of imperatives is
itself an imperative, compounding the ambiguity of the address. If it was already
unclear whether the addressee of the imperative was Rousseau (or rather his
words) or Hölderlin, now a third possibility emerges: the philologist reading
Hölderlin’s manuscript and trying to settle on the solid letter that could arise
from its errant words. For in the same moment that this “Nein!” would address
the poet as the one writing the poem, who speaks to himself in the act of compo-
sition, it must also speak to the philologist as philologist and no longer simply as
reader. And would it not speak at once to neither and both: neither the simple
poet nor the simple philologist but the philological poet who cannot evade the
demand to constitute the words that he reads and passes on to the world as Höl-
derlin’s own? Hölderlin’s “Nein!,” this is to say, addresses the poet himself,
together with his readers, as philologists: it refuses to allow him and them to for-
get that the poet’s words do not exist as facts in the world with one true interpre-
tation but are imperatives commanding toward a community of friendship that
exists, ﬁrst and last, as the conversant, though always asymmetrical, exchange of
such imperatives.
The philological moment in Hölderlin’s poetry involves the convergence of
two tendencies, both of which announce themselves through an imperative: if,
on the one hand, Hölderlin’s text receives Rousseau’s words philologically, it
also inscribes the problematic of philology into the text, refusing to allow it to
appear as a mere question of reception and thus demanding of the philological
reader that, recognizing her own intention in the production of the text, she aban-
don the pretense to scientiﬁc objectivity. Yet this does not sufﬁce to explain the
speciﬁc content of the second imperative, which, once read in its philological
overdetermination, seems to alternate between rather different meanings, com-
manding at once to “be content,” and then again, not to “be content” but to
“hurry contentedly,” but then again not to “hurry contentedly,” but simply to “be
content.” It might seem, indeed, as if Rousseau’s own hesitancy – the hesitancy
of the transcendental prophet at the shore – had asserted itself once again. But
perhaps these seemingly conﬂicting imperatives themselves can be rhymed with
one another. Perhaps to be a philologist, to enter into the friendship of words, is
to pass between “Being” and “rushing” in a way that remains always somehow
zufrieden – content and at peace.
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With this in mind, let us turn to the image of the tree, which follows the sec-
ond imperative. Here there is no signiﬁcant discrepancy between the Stuttgarter
Ausgabe and the constituted text [II D] of the Frankfurter Ausgabe:
[So eile denn zufrieden!/Sei denn zufrieden!] der Baum entwächst
Dem heimatlichen Boden, aber es sinken ihm
Die liebenden, die jugendlichen
Arme, und trauernd neigt er sein Haupt.
Des Lebens Überﬂuß, das Unendliche,
Das um ihn und dämmert, er faßt es nie.
Doch lebts in ihm und gegenwärtig,
Wärmend und wirkend, die Frucht entquillt ihm. (FA 5:787)
The tree seems to provide an image of contentment, and yet it is clear that it is not
contentment as usually conceived. It is not the subjective experience of being “at
peace” with the things that one has been given. Rather, the nature of contentment
in this passage is posed in the most radical terms. On the one hand, the ultimate
source of discontent consists not in a lack but in an excess, nor is it the excess of
this or that particular thing but rather a fundamental ontological excess, and
indeed not as a negative but as a sort of radical positivity. It is the overﬂowing
life, the overﬂow of life that surrounds the tree. If this becomes the cause of dis-
content, however, it is not due to its mere presence but to the fact that, perhaps
precisely as that which passes beyond every ﬁxed and established order, it cannot
be grasped. Rather than being grasped and comprehended, it can only be experi-
enced as the Dämmerung between what is and what is not. Every attempt to seize
upon its meaning must reduce it to the terms of that which exists. Philosophy tries
to grasp the overﬂow of life and thus becomes hopelessly unsettled. And in the
extreme case of the secular, philosophical prophet such as was Rousseau – the
prophet of life and Being – it does not just try to prove and deduce but takes a
stand at the limit between the Being of beings and Non-Being, instituting a new
sort of grounding. But then it ﬁnds itself always yearning, since it knows that
even its own stand opens up a horizon that it cannot stand off from, and that even
in some way still remains contained by the limits of the present time. Yearning to
hurry away from where it is, rushing in deranged imagination away from where it
took its stand, it cannot ﬁnd peace, and not even in the decision to nullify its life:
every limit, and even the limit that it imposes upon itself by owning up to its ﬁni-
tude, is “too narrowly limited” (zu eng begrenzt) (FA 5: 784).
If the tree in turn is content, it is not because it is not subjected to this over-
ﬂow but rather because it is able to enter into a relation with this excess without
engaging in the ultimately hopeless attempt at comprehension. The tree, after all,
does not grasp: it does not have hands with opposable thumbs nor even a mouth
and jaws – it has nothing that could take possession of things as property that
can be held, used, and given away. It only has roots and branches, which take in
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the surplus of life (its expirations and the results of ferment and decay) and
incorporate them into its own body. They simply live within it, and this life, in
turn, brings forth the fruit, which itself, an “overﬂowing” from the life of the
tree, falls to the ground and scatters its seeds. The tree, this is to say, is involved
in an ongoing circulation of the surplus of life – it is an ecological economy, as
it were. The fruit is the product of this circulation, but it is only provisional; in
no way does it exclude itself from the general economy. And what is this fruit
that ﬂows forth “gegenwärtig,/ Wärmend und wirkend . . .” if not the ﬂowing
forth of the present: the present not as the now in a linear sequence of clock
times, nor as the “dream-time” of history, but as the convergence and concretion
of the overﬂowing forces of life into a certain moment of ripeness – a kairos, as
it is said in Greek – in which they become measured and moderate, full of mea-
sured life (wärmend ) and historical efﬁcacy (wirkend ). Hölderlin’s philological
transformation of the prophetic genre, this suggests, neither simply neutralizes
the expectation of fulﬁllment nor submits it to an inﬁnite postponement – as if
anticipating what Agamben, with reference to Derrida, would call a “thwarted
messianism” – but, rather, displaces fulﬁllment into an overﬂowing, self-
transcending, ecstatic immanence (The Time That Remains 103). But in just this
way, the fulﬁllment of Rousseau’s prophetic words demands a relinquishing of
the prophetic stance: the prophet, who stands alone on the shore – at the edge of
the world and time of his contemporaries – opposed to the people whom he can
no longer love, must become a tree. It is perhaps precisely as the work of a tree-
poet that “Rousseau” itself seems to start out as a graft from the ode “An die
Deutschen,” or indeed, in Beißner’s words, “branches off ” from it (GSA 2: 403).
If this image seems so natural and earthy, we must still remind ourselves that
the imperatives of the poem are not so much addressed to Rousseau, or for that
matter Hölderlin, as to their words, and that this contentment, in turn, is above all
the contentment possible in language, at least in so far as it has abandoned a dis-
cursive mode of speech in which language would appear only as the means to
communicate thought. We might even recall the words that Hyperion writes to
Diotima in Hölderlin’s novel: “Die Sprache ist ein großer Überﬂuß” (FA 11:
729). The “lesser” overﬂow is the overﬂow of life, but the great overﬂow is lan-
guage itself. It is in the profusion of words and meanings, of texts and ideals and
systems, that the overﬂow of life ﬁnds its extreme expression and not least of all
because the linguistic economy, unlike the real circulations of wealth and nutri-
ents and other such life-necessities, is not restrained by a principle of physical
limitation. The ﬁgure of the tree thus represents, in “a smaller measure,” how the
philological poet exists: he does not grasp or ground anything, he is neither phi-
losopher nor prophet, but he takes in the overﬂowing words that surround him.
These in turn live in him, and ﬂow out as fruit, ultimately adding to the ever more
overﬂowing surplus, but meanwhile realizing a momentary measure in (and as)
the present. This measure, of which the tree gives a certain example, is the con-
tentment of the poem. It exists between heaven and earth, drawn back to the latter
even as it reaches up toward the former. It passes from hurrying to standing and
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from standing to hurrying, but it is never harried from one to the other. For indeed
it ﬁnds itself contained between the two. It is in this way, as this ho nun kairos –
the ripe time of the present – that the poem comes to be; or indeed that Being
comes to be out of the excess of language – neither as a futile grasping at the un-
graspable nor as the absolute ground but as the conﬁrmation and constancy of
poetry. No longer the ground of the text, Being, itself elided within the poem, be-
comes the space opened up by language that remains to be ﬁlled out. To be con-
tent is to be entirely in the space of the poem, if only in the empty space that has
been left over. The poem, much as Agamben will argue in Stanzas with regard to
poetry in general, appears as a kind of empty space: a lap, womb, or receptacle.
The ﬁgure of the tree, drawn from nature and its metabolisms, would seem
to exclude both a genuinely historical and a genuinely semiotic dimension, sug-
gesting in turn that whereas the transcendental prophet lives on into the future as
a sign awaiting comprehension, the philological poet enjoys a purely natural
existence that differs only from the life of vegetation by taking place in the
“ideal” medium of language rather than a more “physical” economy. Yet were
this so, it would be hard to regard philology as anything more than a retreat from
historical existence, with its catastrophes and disappointments, into the bosom of
nature. After all the detours and byways of the poem, we would then ﬁnd our-
selves before a very conventional Rousseau: the Rousseau of the garden and an
idyllic state of nature. Yet the ﬁnal four stanzas (stanzas 7–10) suggest that such
a reading is untenable. Hölderlin passes back from an imperative to a descriptive
mode, speaking once again of Rousseau’s Rede. But the Rede is different than
before: transﬁgured by friendship and no longer either lonely or futile.
In the Frankfurter Ausgabe, these lines read:
Du hast gelebt! ge auch dir, auch dir
Erfreut die ferne Sonne dein Haupt,
Die Stralen aus der schönern Zeit, es
Haben die Boten dein Herz gefunden.
Vernommen hast du sie die Sprache der Fremdlinge,
Gedeutet ihre Seele! Dem Sehnenden war
Genug der Wink, und Winke sind
Von Alters her die Sprache der Götter.
Und wunderbar, als hätte von Anbeginn
Des Menschen Geist, das Werden und Wirken all,
Des Lebens alte Weise
schon erfahren
Kennt er im ersten Zeichen Vollendetes schon,
Und ﬂiegt, der kühne Geist, wie Adler den
Gewittern, weissagend seinen
Kommenden Göttern, voraus,
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Here we ﬁnd some crucial deviations from the Stuttgarter Ausgabe. To begin
with, Beißner compresses the ﬁnal two lines of the ninth stanza into a single line
and omits the adjective “alte,” even though it is clearly written above the
crossed-out deﬁnite article “die”:
Des Lebens Weise schon erfahren.
Second, following the manuscript precisely, he reads the ﬁrst line of the eighth
stanza:
Vernommen hast du sie, verstanden die Sprache der Fremdlinge,
Sattler, perhaps to avoid such a long and ungainly line, incompatible as it must
be with the Alcaic metre, leaves out “verstanden.” Finally, the Stuttgart edition
leaves out the “ge” of the ﬁrst line of the seventh stanza.
This last point is especially signiﬁcant, since it suggests the radical differ-
ence in their editorial approaches. Whereas Beißner seems to read the solitary
“ge,” followed by a lacuna, as a problematic remnant of Hölderlin’s yet unﬁn-
ished creative process that must be left out in order to give the poem a certain, at
least relative, ﬁnish, Sattler allows it to stand as an extraordinary, if linguistically
impossible and poetically awkward, provocation to the reader. The meaning of
the “ge,” and the space that follows, remains open. Is it a fragment of a past par-
ticiple that the poet did not complete, or the necessary omission of what cannot
be written? Or is it meant somehow simply to stand alone, drawing attention to
the bare quality of ge-ness, of “past participiality”? And does it matter that the
Ge-heit (which is not a Gewesenheit), this purely grammatical artifact, cannot be
said in any language but German and perhaps its closest cognates – not even in
English?
The second to last possibility seems particularly compelling, since it com-
mands the attention of the philological reader to the complex system of tenses
that articulate poetic time and experience in the poem. Beginning with the simple
past, the poem moves dramatically into the present, and now draws back into the
past, yet a different past, expressed through the present perfect. In the ﬁnal four
stanzas the present perfect predominates, and no other past form is used except
in one instance – “war” – where the perfect form could only appear tortured.
This new past differs from the old above all in that it involves an essentially dif-
ferent relation between the past and the present. Whereas the simple past rele-
gates the past to a narrative that, closed off in its own ﬁnitude, can no longer
pass over into the present, the perfect relates the completion of the event to the
condition of the present, suggesting in effect that the completion of the action
itself belongs to the present state of affairs. The simple past, one might say, is in-
herently mythic, whereas the perfect is historical in a rich sense: if the former
consigns events to an archetypal prehistory to which the present time relates
only through analogy, the latter invokes a continuum joining the past with the
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present and the future. As the fourth edition of the Duden Grammatik explains,
the simple past (das Präteritum) is used whenever an event or action has been re-
moved from the present and belongs to the past in so far as, at the moment of
utterance, it has already happened and is abgeschlossen – completed and literally
“closed off” (Drosdowski et al. 148).
Moreover: the perfect tense is warm, friendly, conversational, relaxed. If
Hölderlin’s previous emphatic use of the simple past in combination with the
second-person informal singular du had created a jarring tension between narra-
tive distance and dialogical intimacy, this tension now dissolves. As soon as Höl-
derlin’s imperative called Rousseau, and Rousseau’s words, to friendship, it
could no longer address them in the more distanced register of a narrative tense,
as if they existed only in the past, but it must speak as if the time of Rousseau’s
words were also its own time. For friendship is perhaps above all else this shared
time. It is in this light, moreover, that we must understand the “auch dir, auch
dir.” The “auch” implies others whom Rousseau is like. But written or spoken
by a friend, in the intimacy of a conversation, and without any other context, the
ﬁrst and most obvious other is the friend himself. Hölderlin’s own word, as the
friend of Rousseau’s, is reassuring the latter that it too enjoys what the former
enjoys (the distant sun, and the rays of the more beautiful time), that they both
belong to a present time somehow touched and illuminated by a better time, and
that they both have somehow experienced and done the same thing, with this
having made them what they now are. But the greatest accomplishment of Höl-
derlin’s word is to have become friends with Rousseau’s and thus to have
become philological. So this, in turn, must be what Rousseau’s word has also
done, even if it always seemed, even to itself, as if it were doing something else.
But this would mean, in turn, that the seventh, eighth, and ninth stanzas, by tell-
ing us what Rousseau has also gone through, develop to an even greater extent
than before the meaning of philology.
It might seem as if the poem, with the ﬁnal four stanzas, returns to the prob-
lem of prophesy, and that Hölderlin seeks to reassure Rousseau above all of a
certain inevitable efﬁcacy of the prophetic word. The last stanza, with its some-
what triumphal tone and the image of the “coming gods,” seems to conﬁrm
such an interpretation. Yet a careful reading suggests that, in the third part of
the poem, it is no longer the reception of the poetic word, its ﬁnding its proper
audience, that matters most. Whereas the poem begins with the image of the fru-
strated prophesy that cannot ﬁnd the community through which it would
become “vernehmlich” or the friendly hand that would bring it to warmth and
life, it ends by afﬁrming that Rousseau’s word had itself “vernommen” the lan-
guage of the “strangers” (Fremdlinge); that it had taken this word, which had
reached its heart, into and upon itself – and what else could this mean than be-
friending what is foreign to it. Rousseau’s word, this is to say, can now itself
appear as philology.
The lonely prophet – and what prophet has not been lonely – can never
have friends, save perhaps, as in the case of Jesus and John the Baptist,
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another prophet, although even here the difference that separates the two
seems too great to allow friendship in the more proper sense. He is always
outside or above or before, but never with others. Release from loneliness
could only come through the community to come. Friendship of itself stands
in the way of prophesy: to befriend the prophetic word is not to become its fol-
lower and fanatic, to devote oneself to carrying it out, but to complicate, and
to a degree neutralize, its prophetic tendencies and become open to it in a dif-
ferent way.
Given that the poem, in the seventh stanza, assumes a more friendly, even
casual tone – consider the repetition of “auch dir” or the redundant possessive
(“dein Haupt”) – it is perhaps possible that even the apparently unﬁnished metre
could be seen not as mere evidence of the poem’s unﬁnished status but as a stra-
tegic disordering; just as we might even take the poem’s fragmentary nature (is
it, after all, itself responding to an unﬁnished word?) as itself a philological prov-
ocation. Thus Beißner’s reading of the eighth stanza, which avoids the awkward
“sie die” and in general sounds much more convincing, seems likely:
Vernommen hast du sie, verstanden die Sprache der Fremdlinge,
Gedeutet ihre Seele! Dem Sehnenden war
Der Wink genug, und Winke sind
Von Alters her die Sprache der Götter. (GSA 2: 13)
This reading, moreover, preserves a subtle correspondence between the ﬁrst and
eighth stanzas. The triad warst/sahst/stauntest is replaced with the three past par-
ticiples vernommen, verstanden, gedeutet. If the former presents the characteris-
tic of a singular prophetic experience leading to the “Unvernehmlichkeit” of the
prophetic word, the second, it seems, articulates the essence of the other way, the
way of the philologist. Because of the difference in tense, however, this series
cannot be read in the same way as the other: it does not consist in a temporal pro-
gression of three discrete acts but in three moments or dimensions of the same
event that, even if they involve a certain serial order, are nevertheless logically
interrelated and interdependent. Vernehmen is the act of hearing, of receiving the
stranger’s language or word. Verstehen is the process of understanding. We
understand something when we see how it hangs together with itself and with
other things. Understanding is systematic, and thus to understand the word that
has been heard means, above all, to develop and cultivate it in such a way that
one can stand with it in the present. What is understood becomes the soul or ker-
nel or heart of the word that, having reached our heart, has been heard, and with
which we now relate heart-to-heart, becoming bosom friends. Deuten here
means not just to interpret the soul of language but to point it into another place
and time: to show it the way.
It is perhaps already clear from this how well these three words comple-
ment each other. Vernehmen, while literally transitive, suggests a certain passiv-
ity: the one who hears is transformed and changed by what he hears. Deuten, by
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contrast, is strongly active in meaning: for to interpret something is to transform
it in accordance with one’s will, exerting our power over that which otherwise
resists us in every way (nature, fate, death). Verstehen, ﬁnally, operates more
medially: that which we come to understand transforms us even as we transform
it. Yet even more important, though closely related, is that vernehmen, verste-
hen, and deuten each have a markedly temporal character. The ﬁrst takes place
in the past, the second constitutes the present, and the third points towards
the future.
In this way, the triad vernehmen/verstehen/deuten would seem to fall back
into a more traditionally philosophical discourse. Above all, the centrality of ver-
stehen suggests that the two other moments could only take place, and are in this
sense subordinated to, an act of understanding which gives grounds and ulti-
mately ﬁnds the ground of every ground in the present time to which it belongs.
Yet the continuation (after “Seele!”) of the eighth stanza speaks against such an
interpretation. The disindividualizing use of a nominalized present, together with
an otherwise unremarkable shift from the perfect to the simple past, opens up a
rift between times that interrupts, and indeed breaks away from, the implied pres-
ence of verstehen and also of the present perfect tense. The addressee of the
poem, Rousseau or his word, is now simply “dem Sehnenden” – the yearning
one – with the dative preserving the ambiguity of the address. Yearning begins
with absence, and thus the absolute yearning of the one who is only yearning
always issues from and returns to the absolute lack of Being, substance, life, and
knowledge. In a word, the only ground of yearning is the lack of every ground.
But it is for precisely this one, the one who is yearning and who has nothing or
not even nothing, that the Wink is enough. The one who had or was anything
would need more than just a Wink: he would need to ﬁnd something that he
could bring in relation to himself, something that he could make his own as the
basis of friendship and proximity. But for the one with nothing, the mere beck-
oning of the stranger towards friendship is enough to become friends. And it is
perhaps only in friendship that the Wink also becomes a sign and a hint of some-
thing more. But this something more is only what the friend can discover as
friend. If the friend, in his yearning for friendship, ﬁnds everything in the Wink,
it is neither by realizing his will to power through interpreting what is originally
foreign to his own will, nor by somehow ﬁnding a common ground for interpre-
tation in that which belongs neither to the one nor the other. What the one ﬁnds
in the Wink as he hears it, understands it, and passes it on, is nothing else than
the afﬁnity and friendship of words. This ﬁnding, however, is anything but a ﬂat
and pale tautology. It is not a matter of some abstract “amity,” but of a “real”
and “concrete,” singularly determined and singularly exemplary, friendship.
Yet this friendship, in its concreteness, does not belong ﬁrst of all or simply to
the present.
The human spirit – but if we are a conversation, isn’t the spirit of human-
ity language? – knows “im ersten Zeichen Vollendetes schon”: to know the
ﬁrst sign of friendship, passed on from “old times,” is to know the full
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friendship of the future. This might suggest something like Plato’s doctrine of
remembrance, yet the subjunctive in the ﬁrst line of the previous stanza for-
bids such a reading. The human spirit did not actually already experience from
the beginning “das Werden und Wirken all/ Des Lebens alte Weise,” but it is
as if it had. The most fundamental, foundational experience – the experience
that would ground all other experience – is subjunctive: he experiences only
because it is as if he had experienced. Experience is yearning experience. This
yearning experience is what becomes knowledge (Erkenntnis) through the act
of understanding, and thus understanding itself is also yearning, desiring, ori-
ginating from lack.
The last lines of “Rousseau” move from the past to the future:
Und ﬂiegt, der kühne Geist, wie Adler den
Gewittern, weissagend seinen
Kommenden Göttern, voraus,
The bold spirit, likened to the augural eagle, ﬂies weissagend (it is, as it were, a
winged word) in advance of its coming gods. Here the temptation to see a pro-
phetic moment is greatest, since, with the present participle weissagend, Hölder-
lin seems to identify the spirit with the prophetic spirit that anticipates the new
gods who will ground the new historical age. But the emphatic use of weisen and
Weise earlier in the poem suggests that weissagend also connotes saying the
Weise, where the Weise is both the way that has been experienced and the path
that the deuten points into the future.
The deeper connection between wissen, weisen, Weise, and Weg appears in
the ﬁrst part of the poem: “und niemand / Weiß den beschiedenen Weg zu wei-
sen.” The knowledge that matters the most is knowing how to show the way.
This knowledge is lacking because the person who could know is not there. It is
tempting to suppose that this person or people do not yet exist, that their time
has not yet come. But if the path is the path into the future, and those who could
show the way into the future have not yet arrived, then the future itself would be
completely unreachable. The nobody, the one who is not yet, is simply the
friend, and not a community of hearers that would answer to the prophet’s call.
Such a community, if it does not yet exist, could never exist. But the way then is
of essence the way of the friend, who waves, in a friendly way, into friendship.
And, in a way, there is no need to wait for the friend; he does not belong to the
future but simply comes with the poem.
The coming gods are perhaps nothing more than the greatest friends, the
friends of all who will bind all together in friendship. The spirit of mankind ﬂies
in advance of these: it awaits them. But they are not the realization of what
would be as yet only an ideal of friendship. Every friendship of words, all philol-
ogy, is already a full friendship, already fully realized, even if, in its fullness, it
also points towards others, towards the strangers who must also become friends.
Even though the last stanza speaks of and to the future, it remains within the
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present tense: the spirit ﬂies, saying wisdom and saying the way, in advance of
the gods who are coming. It is not a matter of a future that will arrive after the
present but rather of what is now arriving: an advent and adventure breaking
through the present.
But there is one word, above all, that suggests how far Hölderlin has come
from the ﬁgure of the prophet as it has been understood: Wunderbar. What is
miraculous is no longer either the revelation of divine truth or the miraculous dis-
ruptions of the natural order that would conﬁrm this revelation and cement it into
people’s minds. Philology is no longer subordinated to a theory of miracles and
revelation. Rather: philology, the love of the word for the word, is the miracle.
In this light we might begin to approach Hölderlin’s “Patmos,” which,
together with “Der Einzige,” represents his most intense confrontation with the
Judeo-Christian tradition, the ﬁgure of Christ, and Christian eschatology. In
this poem, named after the Aegean island where St. John the Evangelist re-
ceived his eschatological vision in the Book of Revelation, Hölderlin will seem
to return the paganized (or rather: re-paganized) prophesy of “Rousseau” to a
speciﬁcally Christian idiom (Revelation 1:9). If the philological moment that I
have tried to discover in my reading of “Rousseau” were merely a passing
moment in Hölderlin’s development, or perhaps even the mere effect of a
forced and violent reading, one might expect “Patmos,” written three years
after “Rousseau,” to reafﬁrm the traditional conception of prophesy as the
ecstatic revelation of that which will ﬁnd its fulﬁllment in a future time. Yet
while a close reading of this poem, which is far more complex than “Rousseau”
and has been the subject of enormous scholarly debate, goes beyond the scope
of this present paper, a cursory glance at the last words of the poem – words
that do in fact seem to bring the poem to an end – suggest that precisely here,
in a poem which begins by remarking on the difﬁculty of grasping God despite
his proximity (“Nah is / Und schwer zu fassen der Got”), the philological will
have the last word (GSA 2: 165):
. . . der Vater aber liebt,
Der über allen waltet,
Am meisten, dab gepﬂeget werde
Der veste Buchstab, und bestehendes gut
Gedeutet. Dem folgt deutscher Gesang. (GSA 2: 172)
But could the philological really have the last word? Can philology last? In
the present time, as Michael Holquist observes, philology is widely regarded as
being moribund if not dead. This is only conﬁrmed by the many calls in the last
decades for its revival, starting with Paul de Man’s 1982 essay “The Return of
Philology” (269). And indeed, now more than ever, one hears the call not only
for its revival but its radicalization. For John Hamilton, philology can even claim
a kind of political and social urgency: security, he argues, is an urgent problem,
and it is a problem that must be approached philologically (12). If philology, this
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urgency notwithstanding, sits so uneasily with the present, it is perhaps not just
because this present doesn’t have the time or the patience for it, or because it has
exhausted its purpose, but because the philological is always of essence
untimely. Or as Werner Hamacher puts it, in a text that itself will have much to
say about Hölderlin: “To be able to speak means to be able to speak beyond
everything that has been spoken and means never to be able to speak enough.
The agent of this ‘beyond’ and of this ‘never-enough’ is philology. Philology:
transcending without transcendence” (25).
The last deﬁnition captures the challenge of Hölderlin’s poetics: he is
always transcending, always speaking beyond what has been spoken, opening
up a new horizon for thinking and saying. Yet as much as it might tempt us, this
beyond must not be taken as a transcendence that has already been achieved, and
that, coming before all things, could offer itself as an absolute ground. Hölderlin
is not the exemplary modern, secular poet-prophet, not a seer who will lead us
beyond by speaking from the beyond. Rather, his poetry takes place at the limit
at which, with the inﬁnite imbroglios of language, philology touches and be-
friends prophetic discourse, and, by complicating it without end, holds open
its promise.
Works Cited
Agamben, Giorgio. Stanzas. Trans. Ronald L. Martinez. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P,
1993.
Agamben, Giorgio. The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans.
Trans. Patricia Dailey. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005.
Bartz, H.-W., et al., eds. Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm auf CD
ROM. 1st ed. Frankfurt/M: Zweitausendeins, 2004.
De Man, Paul. “The Image of Rousseau in the Poetry of Hölderlin.” The Rhetoric of
Romanticism. New York: Columbia UP, 1984.
Drosdowski, Günter, et al., eds. Duden: Grammatik der deutschen Gegenwartssprache.
4th ed. Mannheim: Duden Verlag, 1984.
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. The Powers of Philology: Dynamics of Textual Scholarship.
Urbana: U of Illinois P, 2003.
Hamacher, Werner. “95 Theses on Philology.” Trans. Catharine Diehl. Diacritics 39.1
(2009): 25–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/dia.2009.0004.
Hamilton, John T. Security: Politics, Humanity, and the Philology of Care. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400846474.
Hölderlin, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed. Norbert von
Hellingrath and Friedrich Seebass. Vol. 4. Munich: G. Müller, 1923.
Hölderlin, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke (Grosse Stuttgarter Ausgabe). Ed. Friedrich
Beißner. 8 vols. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1946–1984.
Hölderlin, Friedich. Sämtliche Gedichte: Studienausgabe in zwei Bände. Ed. Detlev
Lüders. Bad Homburg: Athenäum Verlag, 1970.
Hölderlin, Friedrich. Sämtliche Werke: Historisch-kritische Ausgabe. Ed. D. E. Sattler.
20 vols. Frankfurt/M: Verlag Roter Stern, 1974–2004.
A Friendship of Words 259
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.u
tp
jou
rna
ls.
pre
ss/
do
i/p
df/
10
.31
38
/se
mi
na
r.2
01
5.5
1.3
.24
2 -
 A
nth
on
y C
urt
is 
Ad
ler
 <a
nth
on
y.a
dle
r@
gm
ail
.co
m>
 - T
ue
sda
y, 
Se
pte
mb
er 
22
, 2
01
5 1
:25
:57
 A
M 
- I
P A
dd
res
s:1
65
.13
2.5
.15
0 
Holquist, Michael. “The Place of Philology in an Age of World Literature.” Neohelicon
38.2 (2011): 267–287. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11059-011-0096-7.
Link, Jürgen. Hölderlin - Rousseau: Inventive Rückkehr. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag,
1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91626-6.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Les Rêveries du promeneur solitaire: suivies des Lettres à Male-
sherbes et d’un choix de textes sur la rêverie. Ed. Robert Morrissey. Paris: Presses
de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003.
260 ANTHONY CURTIS ADLER
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.u
tp
jou
rna
ls.
pre
ss/
do
i/p
df/
10
.31
38
/se
mi
na
r.2
01
5.5
1.3
.24
2 -
 A
nth
on
y C
urt
is 
Ad
ler
 <a
nth
on
y.a
dle
r@
gm
ail
.co
m>
 - T
ue
sda
y, 
Se
pte
mb
er 
22
, 2
01
5 1
:25
:57
 A
M 
- I
P A
dd
res
s:1
65
.13
2.5
.15
0 
